#### SECRET

September 9, 2002 9:47 AM

TO:	Gen. Myers
FROM:	Donald Rumsfeld .
SUBJECT:	WMD
Please take a	a look at this material as to what we don't know about WMD. It is big.
Thanks.	
Attach. 09/05/02 J-2	memo to SecDef, "Status of Iraqi WMD Programs"
DHR:dh 090902-26	
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Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

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THE JOINT STAFF

09/5

Director for Intelligence (J-2) Washington, D.C. 20318-2000

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TO:

CJCS

VCJCS

**ACJCS** 

DJS

SUBJECT: Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Programs

Sir, a couple of weeks ago SECDEF asked me what we don't know (in a percentage) about the Iraqi WMD program. We've struggled to estimate the unknowns, and the attached briefing sums up our best J2 sense. We range from 0% to about 75% knowledge on various aspects of their program. I'd be happy to discuss further if you wish.

GLEN D. SHAFFER

Major General, USAF Director for Intelligence, J2

cc:

DR/DIA SECDEF/MA DEPSECDEF/MA ASD/C3I

J3

J5

DDI

Derived from: Multiple Sources Declassify on SXI Date of Source: 16 August 2002


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
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# IRAQ: STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMS

The overall classification of this briefing is:

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#### IRAQ: STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMS

- We assess Iraq is making significant progress in WMD programs
- Our assessments rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than hard evidence
- The evidentiary base is particularly sparse for Iraqi nuclear programs
- Concerted Iraqi CCD&D have effectively negated our view into large parts of their WMD program

We don't know with any precision how much we don't know

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
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#### IRAQ: NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM


- We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build a nuclear weapon without external expertise
- We are certain many of the processes required to produce a weapon are in place
  - We think they possess a viable weapon design
  - We do not know the status of enrichment capabilities
    - We think a centrifuge enrichment program is under development but not yet operational
- We do not know if they have purchased, or attempted to purchase, a nuclear weapon
- We do not know with confidence the location of any nuclear weapon-related facilities

Our knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is based largely – perhaps 90% -- on analysis of imprecise intelligence

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#### IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM


- We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build biological weapons without external expertise
- We are certain all of the processes required to produce biological weapons are in place
  - We know they have produced anthrax, ricin toxin, botulinum toxin and gas gangrene
- We cannot confirm the identity of any Iraqi facilities that produce, test, fill, or store biological weapons
  - A large number of suspect facilities have been identified that could support R&D/production
  - We believe Iraq has 7 mobile BW agent production plants but cannot locate them

Our knowledge of <u>what</u> biological weapons the Iraqis are able to produce is nearly complete...our knowledge of <u>how</u> and <u>where</u> they are produced is probably up to 90% incomplete

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### IRAQ: CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM


- We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build chemical weapons without external expertise
- We do not know if all the processes required to produce a weapon are in place
  - Demonstrated capability to produce mustard & nerve agents
  - Lack the precursors for sustained nerve agent production
- We can confirm the identity of facilities producing feedstock chemicals suitable for CW precursors
- We cannot confirm the identity of any Iraqi sites that produce final chemical agent

Our overall knowledge of the Iraqi CW program is primarily limited to infrastructure & doctrine. The specific agent and facility knowledge is 60-70 percent incomplete.

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#### IRAQ: BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS

- We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build ballistic missiles without external expertise
- We are certain many of the processes required to produce ballistic missiles are in place
  - We know they can produce short range ballistic missiles (Al Samoud and Ababil-100)
  - We doubt all processes are in place to produce longer range missiles
- We can confirm the identity of most facilities that contribute to ballistic missile production or RDT&E
- We have good information on general storage at production/assembly sites, but little missile-specific data


Our knowledge of the Iraqi ballistic missile program is about half complete for the production process but significantly lacking – less than 25 percent – for staging and storage sites

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